

Asymmetric Polycentric Governance in Tenganan Pegringsingan: Proposing the Indigenous Governance Triad

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Abstract

Tourism in Tenganan Pegringsingan, a Bali Aga village, recorded 1,801 visits in 2021 (a pandemic-affected baseline) and 39,264 in 2024, while customary institutions continued to regulate land, ritual time and tourist access. How local authority units coordinate without tourism-specific formal agreements, and what this implies for polycentric and institutional theory, remains insufficiently explained. This intrinsic qualitative case study draws on fieldwork from January to June 2026, with a follow-up interview in September 2026. Data comprise 21 interviews with 20 informants, participant observation of *petambunan* sessions and customary ceremonies, and documents, namely the *Awig-awig* (the village's written customary constitution), *Perarem* Number 16 of 2020 and visitor records for 2021–2025. Data were analysed with the interactive model of Miles, Huberman and Saldaña. Eight units coordinate under shared *Awig-awig* rules and recognise the customary village as the reference authority, a pattern termed asymmetric polycentrism. Attendance was reported to be higher at customary forums than at BUMDes meetings, but this cannot isolate one institutional pillar. Tourism drew on existing cultural assets and was later supported by deliberate organising; concentrated art shop profits and reliance on foreign visitors indicate pressure on inclusive distribution. The study proposes the Indigenous Governance Triad (IGT) as a case-derived proposition and the CALI framework (Cultural Autonomy, Asymmetric Coordination, Legitimacy-Based Compliance, Inclusive Distribution) as a provisional analytical framework. Both need testing in contrasting cases before diagnostic or predictive use. The case refines, rather than refutes, polycentric governance and commons theory.

Keywords: asymmetric polycentric governance, indigenous governance triad, customary autonomy, Tenganan Pegringsingan, Bali Aga, cultural tourism, institutional theory



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INTRODUCTION

Background

A fundamental paradox in the literature on sustainable tourism and contemporary public administration is the tension between the expansion of the tourism industry and the institutional resilience of customary communities. Although the theory of *Community-Based Tourism* (CBT) promises local empowerment, recent systematic studies show that communal participation in many destinations in developing countries is often trapped in *tokenism* and elite domination, which can erode social cohesion and core cultural values (Wahyuni et al., 2025; Ramli & Zainal, 2023). Classical theory, such as the *Tragedy of the Commons* (Hardin, 1968), argues that resources under open access tend to degrade without state intervention or privatisation. *Polycentric Governance* theory (Ostrom, 1990, 2010; McGinnis, 2011) has challenged this assumption by showing that local communities can manage resources through their own rules, in systems with multiple and nested centres of authority.

Two strands of literature need to be kept distinct. Ansell and Gash (2008) define collaborative governance as an arrangement in which public agencies engage non-state stakeholders in a formal, consensus-oriented and deliberative decision-making process, so formal procedures and agency-initiated forums are part of that definition (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 544). Ostrom's polycentric approach concerns multiple semi-autonomous decision centres, nested enterprises and overlapping rules, and does not make a signed agreement, equal authority or a bureaucratic hierarchy a condition of stability (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 90, 101–102; Ostrom, 2010, p. 552; McGinnis, 2011). Studies of tourism collaboration in Indonesia often adopt the first, more formal, framing (Budiarto et al., 2024). This study therefore does not claim that polycentric theory requires a

memorandum of understanding (MOU). Its narrower question is how actors recognise and coordinate around an authority that predates the other units in tourism settings where state-created bodies also exist (Mayemba et al., 2024). Existing accounts of nested authority and unequal power can describe such arrangements, but say less about why actors accept the precedence of one centre when a written customary constitution already supplies common rules. The absence of a tourism-specific contract in Tenganan does not mean the absence of shared rules. Asymmetric polycentrism is used below as an analytical label for this case, not as a refutation of polycentric theory.

The empirical phenomenon in the Bali Aga village of Tenganan Pegring-singan, Indonesia, presents an analytical puzzle. Recorded visits rose from 1,801 in 2021 to 39,264 in 2024, about 21.8-fold (Desa Adat Tenganan Pegring-singan, 2021–2025). Because 2021 was a pandemic-affected baseline, this ratio mainly reflects the recovery of tourism demand and cannot by itself indicate a governance effect; the annual series and the counting method are therefore reported in Table 3, and no pre-pandemic count was available. The governance question concerns what happened alongside this recovery. No permanent tourism-specific management institution was in place at the end of the period (a management body was dissolved in 2023 and a customary village enterprise, BUPDA, has been drafted but not ratified; see Table 4), the state tourism levy regulation was not adopted, and informants and documents reported no degradation of core customary values (Atmadja et al., 2025). The absence of a dedicated tourism body should not be confused with the absence of formal governance. Tourism is governed through the *Awig-awig* (a written customary constitution from 1842) and coordinated among eight units treated here as semi-autonomous decision centres (the customary village, the administrative village, the Danendra Cooperative, the

Village Ecotourism Network/JED, the Wisnu Foundation, the village-owned enterprise/BUMDes, micro, small and medium enterprises/UMKM, and the banjar), with no tourism-specific agreement binding them (Nuraeni et al., 2025; Korn, 1933, as cited in Maria & Rupa, 2007). The tourism management body (a temporary body formed during the pandemic by customary mandate and dissolved in 2023), BUMDes PAM (*Badan Usaha Milik Desa Perusahaan Air Minumi*), the village-owned water-supply enterprise established in 2022, which runs clean-water and digital financial services and began operating in August 2023) and BUPDA (the customary village enterprise drafted but not ratified) are distinct arrangements: BUMDes PAM does not manage tourism attractions, and since the management body ended in 2023 tourism has been managed directly by the *Klian Adat* through the *petambunan* forum, while the Danendra Cooperative operates the ecotourism packages.

The research gap arising from this phenomenon has three dimensions, each of which appears under-examined in the literature reviewed. First, studies on Indigenous Public Administration (IPA) tend to emphasise cultural legitimacy and normative autonomy, and say less about the operational mechanisms by which legitimacy is translated into multi-actor coordination under commercialisation pressure (Suripto et al., 2021; Mahlala et al., 2023; Coates et al., 2023). Second, work on Polycentric Governance has described nested and unequal authority, but has paid less attention to the basis on which actors recognise a single customary centre whose authority precedes the other units (Dewi et al., 2025; Turnbull et al., 2023). Stakeholder studies from Bali offer a useful comparison. Martadina and Ardiansyah (2023) mapped the stakeholders of ecotourism in Jatiluwih with a power-interest matrix, based on 45 participants, and classified government bodies, the attraction management and the *subak* as key players, with customary stakeholders as context setters. That approach shows

who has power and interest, but not which decisions each actor can take independently or on whom it depends. In Tenganan the customary village holds decision rights over land, ritual calendar and tourist access, and other units depend on it for access and legitimacy (KI-1, KI-2, KI-3, 1 April 2026); Table 5 sets out these decision rights and dependencies. Third, Institutional Theory has rarely been applied together with IPA and polycentric governance to ask why customary rules may secure higher participation than formal state-linked rules. In Tenganan, the *petambunan* forum (customary deliberation) was reported to be well attended, although the *Awig-awig* prescribes no fine for absence, while BUMDes meetings required by the state were less well attended. This contrast, labelled the “compliance paradox”, is consistent with the cognitive-cultural pillar (Scott, 2008) but does not by itself isolate it (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Wirantari et al., 2025).

Tenganan Pegringsingan was selected as an intrinsic case (Stake, 1995). The case is of interest in its own right because of its particular combination of a written customary constitution, an autonomous customary governance system and a tourism sector that grew rapidly after 2021. The purpose of the study is to understand and describe this case in depth. Theoretical propositions are derived from it, but the study does not test general theory or claim universal generalisation. The village maintains an independent customary calendar and a seniority-based *ririgan* system, and the *Awig-awig* has existed in written form since 1842. Institutional continuity is treated as an empirical question, examined through documents and informants’ accounts with the concept of adaptive path dependency (North, 1990; Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000). Evidence of how the system responded to external pressures, such as the pandemic and Karangasem Regency Regional Regulation Number 6 of 2018 on the Second Amendment to Regional Regulation Number 3 of 2010 on Recreation and

Sports Facility Levies, is presented in the Results (Pemerintah Kabupaten Karangasem, 2018; Arini et al., 2024; Sunarta et al., 2023). A prior study by Wiriastari et al. (2024) introduced the concept of the Moral Economy of Sacred Space in Tenganan, but did not map how this cultural legitimacy works within the multi-actor coordination and institutional rules examined here.

This study therefore aims to describe and interpret the dynamics of cultural tourism governance in Tenganan Pegringingan through three theoretical frameworks: Indigenous Public Administration, Polycentric Governance, and Institutional Theory. From this single case it derives a proposition, the Indigenous Governance Triad (IGT): in Tenganan, sustained tourism governance based on customary autonomy was associated with three conditions operating together: (1) cultural legitimacy that formal regulation does not replace, (2) multi-actor coordination based on recognition of a customary centre (asymmetric polycentrism), and (3) compliance that draws on a cognitive-cultural pillar as well as regulative ones. A single positive case can suggest these conditions but cannot show that each is necessary. The IGT is therefore offered as a case-derived proposition for comparative testing. Evidence from contrasting cases would challenge it if tourism governance remained stable where customary legitimacy was weak or replaced by contracts, or if governance failed where all three conditions were present. It would support it if villages with comparable written customary constitutions and recognised centres showed similar coordination patterns, and if villages lacking one condition showed the instability the proposition would lead us to expect.

The contribution of this research is twofold. Theoretically, it refines the discussion of Polycentric Governance by describing Asymmetric Polycentrism as a case-based concept and by proposing the attendance comparison (the “compliance paradox”) as an indicator that can be

examined, with appropriate controls, in other cases (Scott, 2008). Practically, it organises the IGT proposition into a provisional framework, the CALI framework (Cultural Autonomy, Asymmetric Coordination, Legitimacy-Based Compliance, Inclusive Distribution), with questions, evidence requirements and an interpretation procedure (Table 8). CALI has not yet been applied beyond this case and should be treated as provisional. The study also adds a case to the debate on the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968) by showing how shared resources have been managed under membership rules and sanctions, consistent with Ostrom (1990) and Berkes (2012); it does not claim to refute those accounts.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Public administration has moved from the hierarchical-bureaucratic model associated with Wilson (1887) and Weber (1947), which stresses rational-legal rules and the separation of politics and administration, toward more collaborative and networked forms. The older model often fits local cultural contexts in developing countries poorly because it gives little weight to community participation and legitimacy. This limitation opens space for Indigenous Public Administration (IPA) as an alternative paradigm. Suropto, Keban, and Pamungkas (2021) assert that IPA is not merely a variation of conventional public administration, but a paradigm with its own ontology, epistemology, and axiology, in which governance systems based on local wisdom are recognised as legitimate and functional entities. Henderson (1995) adds that the strength of customary administration lies in its embeddedness in cultural values, social networks, and community legitimacy that do not depend on a formal state mandate.

Mahlala et al. (2023) raise the question of identity for IPA within public administration, Coates et al. (2023) put forward Indigenous institutional theory as a theoretical framework and methodological

tool, and Turnbull et al. (2023) describe Indigenous polycentric governance as growing from community values, relations and spirituality. These works supply the analytical dimensions used in this study. In the context of Tenganan Pegringsingan, IPA is operationalised through six dimensions: cultural legitimacy, local knowledge as policy rationality, deliberation and consensus, customary autonomy, communal participation, and customary-based benefit distribution. These six dimensions are an analytic synthesis developed for this study, not a ready-made scale from one source. Cultural legitimacy draws on Henderson's (1995) emphasis on embeddedness in cultural values and community legitimacy; local knowledge as policy rationality draws on the epistemological claims of Suropto et al. (2021); and customary autonomy draws on the sovereignty argument of Coates et al. (2023). Deliberation and consensus, communal participation and customary-based benefit distribution were developed inductively from the *Awig-awig* and the fieldwork material.

To explain how this customary legitimacy operates among various units without a single command hierarchy, this study employs the Polycentric Governance framework. Ostrom (1990, 2010) defines polycentric governance as a system in which many semi-autonomous centres of authority operate within a single institutional ecosystem, mutually adjusting to one another without depending on a single central authority. McGinnis (2011) enriches this concept with the principles of nested governance and redundancy governance, in which smaller units can be nested within larger units without losing their autonomy, so that the system continues to function even when one unit experiences pressure. Rhodes (1996, 1997) complements this framework by emphasising that the stability of modern governance increasingly rests on horizontal coordination based on trust and reputation, rather than on formal contracts or bureaucratic hierarchy alone.

In Tenganan Pegringsingan, eight units are treated as semi-autonomous decision centres: the customary village, the administrative village, the cooperative, JED, the foundation, BUMDes, UMKM and the *banjar*. Stakeholders are distinguished from decision centres. A stakeholder is any party affected by tourism or able to influence it, including tourists, the Karangasem Regency Tourism Office and residents who do not manage a unit; a decision centre is a unit that can make binding decisions within its own domain. Tourists are therefore stakeholders subject to customary protocol, not decision centres. Table 5 presents an actor matrix showing each unit's jurisdiction, independent decisions, resources and relationship with customary authority. Coordination among these units has operated without a tourism-specific MOU, but within the common rules of the *Awig-awig*, sustained by a legitimacy hierarchy that actors recognise.

The persistence of coordination without tourism-specific contracts cannot be separated from the dynamics of formal and informal rules examined in Institutional Theory. North (1990) distinguishes institutions as the rules of the game and organisations as their actors, and argues that informal institutions often shape social behaviour alongside formal ones because of their lower transaction costs. Formal and informal institutions are classified here by how rules are created, recorded and enforced, not by whether they are customary. Following Helmke and Levitsky (2004), informal institutions are socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels, such as norms of voluntary donation or *ngayah*. State-linked formal institutions are rules codified and enforced through state or organisational channels, such as the tourism levy regulation or BUMDes statutes. The *Awig-awig* does not fit either category neatly: it is a written, enforceable customary constitution, so it is treated as a customary institution with formal characteristics (written

and enforceable within the community) and is not equated with informality.

Scott (2008) formulates three institutional pillars that serve as sources of compliance: the regulative pillar (based on sanctions and coercion), the normative pillar (based on moral obligation), and the cognitive-cultural pillar (based on taken-for-granted beliefs or identity). Which pillars underpin the *Awig-awig* and which underpin BUMDes are treated as empirical questions examined in the Results and Discussion, not assumed in advance: state-linked institutions may also draw on normative and cognitive elements, and customary institutions may also rely on sanctions. This resilience mechanism is reinforced by the concept of path dependency (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000), which explains that institutions that have shaped behavioural patterns over long periods tend to maintain their path because the cost of deviation increases while the benefits of coordination grow larger. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) complement this analysis with a typology of formal-informal institutional interaction (complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive). The typology is applied below to specific customary–state rule pairs, such as the voluntary donation system and the tourism levy regulation, not to the village as a whole.

Taken together, these three theoretical frameworks do not stand alone, but are combined in a case-derived proposition referred to as the Indigenous Governance Triad. In this construction, IPA functions as the core theory that explains the source of legitimacy and rationality of customary governance. Polycentric governance serves as the operational lens for multi-actor coordination without a single hierarchy. Institutional Theory functions as an analytical tool to examine why customary rules may secure compliance differently from formal state regulation. The combination offers an analytic lens for understanding how cultural tourism in Tenganan Pegringsingan grew without reported erosion of core

customary values, and contributes a case to the debate on the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968) through the management of shared resources under membership rules and sanctions.

METHOD

Research Design and Approach

This study adopted a constructivist paradigm with a qualitative approach and an intrinsic case study design (Stake, 1995). The qualitative approach was chosen because the study aims to understand holistically how cultural tourism governance operates through the perspectives of the actors involved, exploring meaning, social construction, and institutional dynamics that cannot be reduced to measurable variables (Creswell & Poth, 2018). An intrinsic design was selected because the Bali Aga village of Tenganan Pegringsingan is of interest in its own right, owing to its collective-collegial customary governance system based on the *Awig-awig* (1842) and its tourism growth after 2021. The case is not treated as an instrument for testing general theory. The purpose of the study is therefore to understand and describe the case in depth and, from it, to derive propositions that later comparative work can test. Indigenous Public Administration (IPA), Polycentric Governance and Institutional Theory are used as sensitising lenses to organise the empirical material, not as hypotheses to be confirmed.

Research Location and Participants

This study was conducted in the Bali Aga village of Tenganan Pegringsingan, Manggis District, Karangasem Regency, Bali, from January to June 2026. The location was selected because of its autonomous customary governance system and its experience of rapid tourism growth. Informants were recruited through purposive sampling followed by snowball sampling (Creswell & Poth, 2018). The study involved a total of 20 informants in three categories: (1) Key Informants (3), consisting

of two customary *Klian* (the de facto leaders in the *petambunan* forum) and one *Perbekel* (Head of the Administrative Village) as a representative of the formal government; (2) Main Informants (2), including the former village tourism manager (2020–2023), who also manages the Danendra Cooperative, and a facilitator of the Wisnu Foundation, who has accompanied the community for 27 years and also runs JED; and (3) Supporting Informants (15), comprising a representative of the Karangasem Regency Tourism Office, three local business actors (two crafts-women and a local guide who is a member of the Danendra Cooperative), a customary elder who served as village head from 1983 to 1993, the chair of BUMDes, four young *krama* (*daha* and *truna*) involved in the donation booth, and five tourists (three domestic, two international).

Twenty-one interviews were conducted between February and May 2026, with one follow-up interview in September 2026. The former tourism manager (MI-1) was interviewed twice, on 31 March and 19 May 2026. Inclusion criteria were actors judged to have the deepest knowledge of, and direct involvement in, tourism governance and customary life, chosen for depth of involvement and not for population representativeness (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Recruitment began with the customary leaders and proceeded through snowball referrals from key customary figures. The number of interviews was judged sufficient

on the basis of the information power of the sample given the narrow aim of the study (Malterud et al., 2016). Table 1 summarises the sample by category, role, number and anonymised code.

The listed positions emphasise institutional representatives. *Krama desa* were not interviewed as a separate group: the key and main informants are themselves core *krama* and speak from that position, not as statistical representatives of all *krama*. Residents with little or no tourism income and residents who disagree with customary leaders were not sampled as separate categories, and no informant from either group is identified in the data. Women and younger *krama* were not sampled as separate categories either, but some appear among the informants: two women craft entrepreneurs (*geringsing* and *ata*), a young woman (*daha*), a young woman who staffs the donation booth and two young men who work there. Where these groups are not represented, findings on voluntary recognition and inclusive benefits are limited to the perspectives of those interviewed and are not extended to the whole community. Young people working outside the village were not interviewed, so findings on youth involvement reflect those engaged in village tourism. The three categories support triangulation among customary authority, state bureaucracy and the grassroots community only to the extent that these informants were reached.

Table 1. Informants by category, role, number and anonymised code

Category	Role	Number	Anonymised code
Key informants	Customary <i>Klian</i> (leaders of the <i>petambunan</i> forum)	2	KI-1 to KI-2
Key informants	<i>Perbekel</i> (head of the administrative village)	1	KI-3
Main informants	Former village tourism manager, 2020–2023, (also manages the Danendra Cooperative)	1	MI-1
Main informants	Wisnu Foundation facilitator (also runs JED)	1	MI-2

Category	Role	Number	Anonymised code
Supporting informants	Karangasem Regency Tourism Office representatives	1	SI-1
Supporting informants	Local business actors (two craftswomen, one local guide)	3	SI-2 to SI-4
Supporting informants	Customary elder, village head 1983–1993	1	SI-5
Supporting informants	BUMDes chair	1	SI-6
Supporting informants	Young krama (<i>daha</i> and <i>truna</i>) involved in the donation booth	4	SI-7 to SI-10
Supporting informants	Tourists (three domestic, two international)	5	SI-11 to SI-15
Total		20	

Data Collection Techniques

Data were collected through three complementary techniques. First, semi-structured in-depth interviews lasting 60–120 minutes per session were conducted, with 21 interviews completed, focusing on the dynamics of cultural legitimacy, multi-actor coordination mechanisms, and the interaction between customary rules and formal regulation (Brinkmann, 2022). Interviews were held in Indonesian and Balinese, according to each informant's preference, audio-recorded with consent and transcribed verbatim; recordings were transcribed with an automatic transcription service (TurboScribe) and checked against the audio by the first author. Balinese passages were translated into Indonesian by the first author, who speaks Balinese.

Second, participant observation was conducted throughout the fieldwork period at *petambunan* sessions and customary ceremonies (including *Perang Pandan*, *Nganyungan Loka*, *Metruna Nyoman* and *Medaha*), to observe social practices such as the deliberation mechanism and the daily interaction between village krama and tourists, with observations recorded daily in descriptive, reflective and methodological field notes (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2011). Third, documentary study covered

the *Awig-awig*, *Perarem* Number 16 of 2020, tourism visitor statistics (2021–2025, obtained from the donation booth staff), the Wisnu Foundation's mentoring archives, programme documents of the Danendra Cooperative and JED, and Bali Provincial Regulation Number 4 of 2019 on customary villages (Bowen, 2009).

The *Awig-awig* edition analysed is the *Pangeling-Eling* text of 1842 and its recompilation after a village fire, in a transcription with an Indonesian translation issued as reference material for developing the village *Awig-awig*, which records that the original text was destroyed by fire in 1841, was rewritten in 1842 with the permission of the ruler of Klungkung and was supplemented in 1925 (the compiler is not named in the edition), and the Indonesian translation in that edition was read alongside the Balinese text. The 1842 text was compared with later *perarem* and dated mentoring records to trace changes in rules, and each change was logged with its date and source. Documents can show change in formal rules over a long period, whereas six months of fieldwork shows current practice. Continuity of practice between the two is inferred from documents and informants' recollections and was not observed directly.

Data Analysis

Data were analysed iteratively with the interactive model of Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña (2020). In data condensation, 21 interview transcripts, the observation notes and the documents were coded manually by the first author in structured coding matrices prepared in Microsoft Word, without CAQDAS software. The codebook began with sensitising codes drawn from the three frameworks and was revised when themes that did not fit them emerged, namely the concentration of art shop profits and the formalisation of the *metruna nyoman* initiation. The codebook contains 36 codes applied to 203 coded segments in the stakeholder interviews, and initial codes from a resilience framework that was later dropped were merged into the three frameworks.

These counts cover the stakeholder interviews coded in the matrices, and the codebook is available from the corresponding author on request. In data display, coded material was compared across informant categories and arranged in actor matrices, a *petambunan* mechanism flowchart and institutional diagrams. In conclusion drawing and verification, patterns were checked by triangulating interviews, observations and documents and by member checking (see Data Validity and Research Ethics). Table 2 shows how selected excerpts, observations and documentary passages led to codes, themes and propositions. The actor matrix and institutional chronology are presented as Table 5 and Table 4, and the remaining matrices and diagrams are made available as Supplementary Material [S1].

Table 2. Audit trail from evidence to code, theme and proposition (selected examples)

Source ID, date and evidence	Code	Theme	Proposition or use
KI-3, 1 April 2026: “This land also belongs to the customary village... we are not allowed to build a two-storey building here.”	OF-FICE_ON_ADAT_LAND; DEFERENCE_TO_ADAT	Asymmetric coordination	IGT Condition 2; Table 5
KI-1, 1 April 2026: “The most important item on our agenda is ceremony... that is why no house here may be left empty.”	PARTICIPATION_ADAT; OBLIGATION_NGAYAH	Legitimacy-based compliance	IGT Condition 3; Table 9
<i>Awig-awig</i> Art. 7 (Indonesian translation edition, p. 2): villagers are forbidden to pledge or sell rice fields, dry fields or house yards.	LAND_SALE_PROHIBITION	Cultural autonomy	IGT Condition 1; Table 6, row 1

Source ID, date and evidence	Code	Theme	Proposition or use
Theme that did not fit the initial framework: SI-2, 2 April 2026: “It is rented from the customary village... on average about 2 to 3 million [rupiah] a month.” (see also Wirantari et al., 2025)	PRI-VATE_PROFIT; STRATIFICATION	Concentration of benefits	Added Inclusive Distribution as CALI component I
Theme that did not fit the initial framework: MI-1, 19 May 2026: “The rule that gambling is allowed only in the second month now seems no longer to apply.” SI-6, 1 April 2026: passing on governance knowledge “comes back to each individual.”	RULE_NORMALISATION; UNEVEN_TRANSFER	Reproduction of the cognitive pillar at risk	Boundary condition; recommendation on <i>pararem</i>

Data Validity and Research Ethics

Data validity was addressed through the criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), operationalised through triangulation of sources, methods, and theory, and member checking through a follow-up interview with a main informant to test initial interpretations. Member checking took the form of a follow-up interview with MI-1 on 19 May 2026, in which the preliminary actor map and the draft CALI framework were presented. MI-1 confirmed the central role of the customary village but corrected three readings. The Danendra Cooperative is owned by its members and is not an organ of the customary village, the agreement on ecotourism packages binds the cooperative and JED rather than the customary village, and two freelance local guides operate outside the cooperative without contributing to the village. He also disputed the reading that slow collective decisions reflected neglect of tourism, describing urgency as relative. Given the sensitivity of research on customary communities, research ethics were

strictly upheld. In addition to informed consent and confidentiality of informant identities (informants are identified only by the anonymised codes in Table 1, and no informant is named in the text), this study applies reflexivity practices to manage the researcher’s positionality and avoid romanticisation bias toward customary governance (Coates et al., 2023). The researcher sought disconfirming evidence and managed the risk of hidden transcripts (narratives of subordinate groups, Scott, 1990) by creating a safe and private interview space and by comparing interview data with observation to detect inconsistencies between public narratives and social reality (Brinkmann, 2022).

Two sets of disconfirming evidence changed the interpretation. First, the initial reading treated tourism benefits as flowing into a collective system; evidence of private profits in family art shops (Wirantari et al., 2025; SI-2, 2 April 2026) qualified this reading and led to the addition of Inclusive Distribution as a fourth component of the CALI framework. Second, accounts that some customary rules are being

relaxed in practice, such as the limit on gambling to one month a year (MI-1, 19 May 2026), and that passing on governance knowledge to the young depends on individual initiative (SI-6, 1 April 2026), led to treating the cognitive pillar as dependent on continued reproduction, not as self-sustaining.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The clearest governance finding concerns what happened when the dedicated tourism management body was dissolved in 2023: its functions reverted to the *Klian Adat* and the *petambunan* forum, and no replacement body had been ratified by the end of the study period (Table 4) (MI-1, 31 March 2026, KI-1, 1 April 2026, MI-2, April 2026). This occurred while recorded visits recovered from 1,801 in 2021, a pandemic-affected baseline, to 39,264 in 2024 (Table 3), without adoption of the state tourism levy regulation and with no reported degradation of core customary values.

The research findings are not merely described but reconstructed through three theoretical lenses integrated in a layered manner. Indigenous Public Administration (IPA) is used to unpack the source of legitimacy and autonomy; Polycentric Governance is used to map the architecture of multi-actor coordination operating without tourism-specific formal contracts; and Institutional Theory is used to examine why participation appeared higher in customary

forums than in formal state-linked meetings. Table 6 synthesises the empirical findings for each framework and the proposed concepts that follow from them, culminating in a provisional framework rather than a validated model.

Case context: visitor trends and institutional chronology

Table 3 reports the annual visitor series. The rise from 1,801 recorded visits in 2021 to 39,264 in 2024 is about 21.8-fold, but 2021 was a pandemic-affected year, so the ratio mainly reflects the recovery of tourism demand and is not evidence of a governance effect on its own. Recovery is an alternative explanation that these totals cannot exclude; the analysis therefore concentrates on how governance arrangements operated during the recovery, not on whether they caused it. The annual series was obtained from the staff of the donation booth at the village entrance, which is run on a voluntary *rota* by young *krama* under the authority of the *Klian Adat*, and the records distinguish international and domestic visitors (MI-1, 19 May 2026). The records do not state whether counts derive from a guest register or from head counts, so consistency of the method across years could not be verified. No 2019 count was available. BUMDes PAM began operating in August 2023 (SI-6, 1 April 2026) and cannot be a source of pre-pandemic figures, so the 2021 baseline cannot be compared with a pre-pandemic year.

Table 3. Annual recorded visitors to Tenganan Pegringsingan

Year	Recorded visitors	Source and notes
2019	Not available	No count available to the researcher. BUMDes PAM began operating in August 2023 and holds no earlier visitor records (SI-6, 1 April 2026).
2021	1,801 (91 international; 1,710 domestic)	Desa Adat Tenganan Pegringsingan (2021–2025); pandemic-affected baseline

Year	Recorded visitors	Source and notes
2022	17,670 (12,974 international; 4,696 domestic)	Same source; +881% on 2021
2023	38,800 (31,360 international; 7,440 domestic)	Same source; +120% on 2022
2024	39,264 (32,495 international; 6,751 domestic)	Same source; about 21.8 times the 2021 count
2025	35,976 (29,224 international; 6,423 domestic)	Same source; -8.4% on 2024, calculated as $(39,264 - 35,976) / 39,264$; international visits -10.1%, domestic -4.9%

Table 4 sets out a short institutional chronology. It distinguishes the absence of a dedicated, permanent tourism management body from the absence of formal governance. The *Awig-awig*, customary forums and customary village authority were in place throughout, while tourism-specific bodies were created, changed or dissolved

around them. The management body dissolved in 2023 therefore does not contradict the finding that tourism governance did not depend on a permanent dedicated institution: it shows that such a body existed for a period and that its functions reverted to the *Klian Adat* when it was dissolved.

Table 4. Institutional chronology of tourism-related governance in Tenganan Pegringsingan

Year	Event	Type of arrangement	Source
1842	Written <i>Awig-awig</i>	Customary constitution (written, enforceable within the community)	<i>Awig-awig</i> transcription and Indonesian translation (Arts. 24–25)
1998–1999	Wisnu Foundation begins accompanying the community (27 years before 2026)	External facilitation	MI-2, April 2026 (initial contact 1998, funded programme from 1999)
1999 (as a self-help group, KSM Bali-aga); 2002 (as a cooperative)	Danendra Cooperative established	Community economic organisation	MI-1, 19 May 2026
2001 (formally launched 2002)	JED established as a network of village communities, with the Danendra Cooperative as Tenganan's member (11 member communities)	Village ecotourism network	MI-2, April 2026

Year	Event	Type of arrangement	Source
2018	Karangasem Regency regional regulation on tourism-object levies (Regional Regulation Number 6 of 2018); not applied in Tenganan	State regulation	KI-2, 1 April 2026
2020	<i>Perarem</i> Number 16 of 2020	Customary regulation	<i>Perarem</i> Number 16 of 2020 (document)
2021	1,801 visits recorded; first place in the national Anugerah Desa Wisata Indonesia (ADWI)	—	Visitor data
2022	BUMDes (BUMDes PAM, the water-supply enterprise) established as a village-competition requirement; runs clean-water and digital financial services, not tourism	State-linked village enterprise	SI-6, 1 April 2026
2023	Tourism management body, formed during the pandemic (2020–2023), dissolved; functions revert to the Klian Adat	Dissolution of a dedicated tourism body	MI-1, 31 March 2026
2023–2025	BUPDA draft completed; ratification pending	Proposed customary village enterprise	MI-1, 31 March and 19 May 2026, MI-2, April 2026
2024	39,264 visits recorded	—	Visitor data
2025	Decline of 8.4% (39,264 to 35,976; Table 3)	—	Desa Adat Tenganan Pegringsingan (2021–2025)
Jan–Jun 2026	Fieldwork for this study	—	—

Table 5 distinguishes decision centres from stakeholders. A decision centre can make binding decisions within a domain without prior approval from another unit; a stakeholder is any party affected by or able to influence tourism, including tourists, the Karangasem Regency Tourism Office and residents who do not manage a unit. Tourists are treated as stakeholders

subject to customary protocol and the *banjar* as a decision centre. Informants described the *banjar* as units for residence, ritual duties and upkeep, not as bodies that take tourism decisions on their own (KI-1, 1 April 2026, SI-4, 2 April 2026), so the *banjar* has the least independent tourism decision-making authority among the eight decision centres.

Table 5. Actor matrix: decision centres in tourism governance in Tenganan Pegringsingan

Unit	Jurisdiction	Decisions it can make independently	Resources	Relationship with customary authority
Customary village (<i>desa adat</i> ; Klian Adat, <i>petambunan</i>)	Customary territory, <i>Awig-awig</i> , 197 ha forest, 255 ha paddy fields	Land use and prohibition of land sale (Art. 7, 37, 48); ceremonial calendar; protocol for tourist access; ratification of BUPDA	Customary treasury; donations; forest and <i>subak</i> conservation funds	Reference authority
Administrative village (<i>desa dinas</i> ; <i>Perbekel</i>)	State administrative functions for residents	Population and administrative services across three customary villages; submits development proposals to the customary village, which must permit them first; decides on population administration and on programmes in the other hamlets without customary approval (KI-3, 1 April 2026)	About 25% of visitor donations passed on by the customary village (unwritten custom); village funds (<i>dana desa</i>), allocated mainly to the other hamlets (KI-3, MI-2)	Office stands on customary land; buildings above one storey and road paving beyond customary limits are not permitted (<i>Perbekel</i> interview); a planned Koperasi Merah Putih outlet could not be built for lack of village land, and the 25% donation share has no written basis (KI-3, 1 April 2026, MI-1, 19 May 2026)
Danendra Cooperative	Ecotourism operations: local guides, village tour and trekking packages, benefit-sharing across 11 communities	Package prices (village tour IDR 150,000–200,000; customary-forest trekking IDR 300,000 per person)	Package revenue; fixed contributions paid to the customary village	Nested in customary territory; its MoU is with JED, not with the customary village

Unit	Jurisdiction	Decisions it can make independently	Resources	Relationship with customary authority
Village Ecotourism Network (JED)	Ecotourism, guide training, trekking services	Retains about 25% of revenue for network operations; year-end profit shared about 30% equally among 11 communities and 70% by visit contribution	Package bookings through the network (about USD 75 per person, including airport transport and a management fee)	Operates on customary paths under customary rules
Wisnu Foundation	External facilitation and training for about 27 years	Participatory mapping, strategic planning and guide training under its own programme; no decision rights over customary decisions	Yayasan KEHATI (from 1999) and project-based grants (MI-2)	Project-based; no permanent MoU with the customary village; informants say it has taken over no <i>Klian Adat</i> decision in 27 years. Accepted: participatory mapping (1999–2000), strategic and spatial planning (2001), formation of JED and the Danendra Cooperative, the customary forest application. Accepted with conditions: cultural documentation kept in the village. Pending: draft BUPDA <i>pararem</i> (2023–2025), not ratified by the <i>petambunan</i> . No outright rejection found (MI-1, MI-2, SI-5).

Unit	Jurisdiction	Decisions it can make independently	Resources	Relationship with customary authority
BUMDes (BUMDes PAM)	State-linked village enterprise; clean-water supply and digital financial services since 2023 (not tourism management)	Water tariffs set by deliberation and recorded in a village regulation; profit split 50% to the village treasury and 50% to next-year capital	Net profit of about IDR 15 million in 2025	Formed in 2022 to meet a village-competition requirement; the chair's authority binds only within BUMDes and relies on village and customary officials to explain tariffs; meetings sparsely attended
UMKM and family art shops	Family businesses, mainly <i>geringsing</i> sales along the main road	<i>Geringsing</i> pieces about IDR 2.5 to 5 million and art products from about IDR 400,000 (SI-2, SI-3, 2 April 2026)	Private profits; stall rent paid to the customary treasury	Bound by the <i>Awig-awig</i> ; concentration of profits noted
Banjar	Residential divisions: three customary <i>banjar</i> (<i>Kauh, Tengah, Pande/Kangin</i>) and five administrative <i>banjar</i> (KI-1, SI-4)	Ritual and residential duties, including upkeep of the <i>Banjar Pande</i> temple and public spaces (SI-4, 2 April 2026). No independent tourism decisions reported	Members' labour and contributions	Subordinate to the customary village under the <i>Awig-awig</i> (Arts. 35, 41)

Which decision rights and dependencies distinguish Tenganan's asymmetric coordination? In the Jatiluwih power-interest map, customary stakeholders appear as context setters (Martadina & Ardiansyah, 2023). In Tenganan, the customary village holds the decision rights on which other units' activity depends: land, ritual

time and tourist access. JED and the Wisnu Foundation work on customary land and paths, so their activity depends on customary permission, while BUMDes and the administrative village rely on state mandates but still depend on the customary village for legitimacy and access (MI-2, April 2026, KI-3 and SI-6, 1 April 2026).

Table 6. Synthesis of Research Findings: Theoretical Interpretation and Proposed Concepts in Tourism Governance Based on Customary Autonomy

Analytical Focus (Theoretical Framework)	Key Question / Analytical Dimension	Main Empirical Findings (Tenganan Field Evidence)	Proposed Concept & Interpretation
1. Indigenous Public Administration (IPA)	How is customary authority maintained under commercial and state pressure?	1. 2018 Karangasem Regency tourism-object levy regulation not applied; the <i>Klian Adat</i> posed five technical questions that the Regency has not answered (Regional Regulation Number 6 of 2018, KI-2, 1 April 2026).	Concept 1: Epistemological sovereignty and structural egalitarianism.
(Foundation of Legitimacy)		2. Land sale prohibited (<i>Awig-awig</i> Art. 7, 37); no commercial accommodation in the core area (KI-1, 1 April 2026, MI-1, 19 May 2026).	Authority covers customary time as well as territory.
		3. Leaders receive the smallest share of compensation (KI-1, 1 April 2026, MI-1, 19 May 2026).	
2. Polycentric Governance	How do eight units coordinate without a single hierarchy or a tourism-specific MOU?	1. Three adjacent parking zones run by different entities: the East zone was granted to the customary village, while the Upper and VIP zones are managed by the regional government; no MoU exists, and the <i>Klian Adat</i> chose not to collect from the other zones although entitled (KI-2, 1 April 2026, SI-5, 2 April 2026).	Concept 2: Asymmetric polycentrism.
(Coordination Mechanism)		2. The administrative village office stands on customary land, and building height and development proposals are subject to customary permission (Table 5; KI-3, 1 April 2026).	Stable where actors recognise the customary village as the reference authority.
		3. Tourism management body dissolved in 2023; functions reverted to the <i>Klian Adat</i> (MI-1, 31 March 2026, Table 4).	

Analytical Focus (Theoretical Framework)	Key Question / Analytical Dimension	Main Empirical Findings (Tenganan Field Evidence)	Proposed Concept & Interpretation
3. Institutional Theory	Why was participation higher in customary forums than in state-linked meetings?	1. <i>Petambunan</i> reported as well attended without a fine for absence; BUMDes meetings sparsely attended (Table 9).	Concept 3: Compliance paradox and typological simultaneity.
(Rules & Compliance)		2. Voluntary donations used instead of an entrance ticket for more than four decades (KI-2, 1 April 2026, SI-5 and SI-7, 2 April 2026).	Consistent with, but not isolating, the cognitive-cultural pillar.
		3. Different customary–state rule pairs fit different Helmke and Levitsky types (Table 10).	
4. Dynamics of Cultural Tourism	Where does the tourism product originate, who runs it, and how do the rules direct its growth?	1. Main attractions (<i>geringsing</i> , ritual, trekking paths) come from existing cultural and agricultural practice.	Concept 4: Tourism as an out-growth of existing culture.
(Empirical Integration)		2. Visits rose without a formal tourism master plan but with deliberate organising by JED, the Wisnu Foundation and the management body dissolved in 2023.	Customary governance came first; tourism was then organised within it.
		3. Collective income (donations, parking, trekking) goes to customary and conservation funds; art shop profits are private (Table 7).	
5. Model Synthesis	What framework describes this system’s resilience, and how could it be assessed elsewhere?	1. <i>Awig-awig</i> in written form since 1842; continuity of practice traced through Perarem Number 16 of 2020 and informants’ accounts.	Concept 5: IGT and CALI framework.

Analytical Focus (Theoretical Framework)	Key Question / Analytical Dimension	Main Empirical Findings (Tenganan Field Evidence)	Proposed Concept & Interpretation
(Main Proposition)		2. 197 ha of forest and 255 ha of paddy fields under customary tenure (<i>Perarem</i> Number 16 of 2020).	Case-derived IGT with three conditions, organised in the provisional CALI framework.
		3. Informants report that most migrant krama return to the village after starting families (no percentage was reported).	

Elaboration and Theoretical Implications: From Paradox to a Provisional CALI Framework

The explanation following this table draws the three interpretations above into a case-derived proposition and a provisional framework, which are the study's main contributions.

Table 6 lists the evidence and the concept attached to each lens; the interpretation is given here. For IPA, authority in Tenganan covers time as well as territory: the independent customary calendar leads tourists to adapt to the customary rhythm, and leadership rests on service rather than accumulated privilege (Concept 1). For polycentric governance, coordination is stable where actors recognise the customary village as the reference authority within shared *Awig-awig* rules, which refines rather than refutes nested accounts (Ostrom, 1990, 2010; McGinnis, 2011) (Concept 2). For institutional theory, the attendance contrast is an observable indicator consistent with the cognitive-cultural pillar (Scott, 2008) but does not by itself isolate the effect of one pillar (Concept 3). For cultural tourism, the sequence differs from the one assumed in much Community-Based Tourism (CBT) literature (design attractions, form an institution, then set rules): in Tenganan the customary governance system came first, and tourism was then organised within it, not left unplanned (Concept 4).

1. Tourism and Pre-existing Customary Governance

A main finding of this study concerns the position of tourism in the life of the customary community. Mainstream literature on Community-Based Tourism (CBT) often assumes that a community designs tourist attractions, forms a managing institution (such as a BUMDes or Pokdarwis), and then builds rules to control impacts. In Tenganan, a customary governance system (based on the *Awig-awig* of 1842) was already in place long before tourism became a significant economic sector. The term 'byproduct' is used here in a limited sense. It describes the origin of the main attractions: *geringsing* weaving, ritual and agricultural landscapes existed as part of community life and were not created for visitors. It does not mean that tourism was unplanned or unorganised. Guide training, trekking services, the tourism management body dissolved in 2023 and the BUPDA draft all reflect deliberate organising of tourism, much of it supported by JED and the Wisnu Foundation (Table 4). What distinguishes Tenganan is the priority given to customary rules: tourism is positioned as a 'guest' that must adapt to the customary rhythm, and informants reported that expansion had not eroded core customary values (KI-1, KI-2, 1 April 2026, SI-5, 2 April 2026).

2. Elaboration of Tourism Products and Attractions: *Geringsing* Weaving, Customary Trekking, and Ritual as Living Culture

The most iconic tourism product from Tenganan Pegringsingan is *geringsing* cloth, a double weave (*double ikat*) produced as a multigenerational craft in Tenganan and in only a few other places worldwide. Weaving a single piece of *geringsing* cloth can take two to five years because the dyeing of the thread must go through ritual stages and use natural materials (*kepundung*, noni root, candlenut oil) that cannot be accelerated for market demand. This cloth is not produced as a mass souvenir, but continues to function as a mandatory item in *metatah* (tooth-filing) ceremonies, customary weddings, and *Usaba Sambah*, so that tourists who buy *geringsing* are actually accessing a fragment of a living religious system, not a commodity specifically engineered for the tourism market (Maria & Rupa, 2007; Wiriastari et al., 2024).

Its economic value is channeled largely through art shops owned by *krama* families along the village's main road. Wirantari et al. (2025) report that this channel has begun to produce privatised profits and a new social stratification based on business ownership. This is counterevidence to a simple reading of inclusive distribution and is taken into account in the assessment of the Inclusive Distribution component of CALI below. Family art shop profits are private, whereas donations, parking and trekking income are collective (Table 7).

The second product is trekking or nature walks that use paths which are the everyday production and ceremonial paths of the *krama*, namely the 197-hectare customary forest and the 255-hectare communal paddy fields. Instead of building new tourist trails, the Village Ecotourism Network (JED) and the Wisnu Foundation, which have accompanied the community for 27 years, train local guides to lead tourists along the same paths that *krama* use for

farming, gathering firewood in accordance with customary rules, or heading to ceremonial areas. Guide training and trekking services are intentional tourism development, so this product shows deliberate organising built on existing land use, not an absence of planning. The trekking routes ride upon a customary land-use system regulated by Articles 7, 37, and 48 of the *Awig-awig*, so that tourism activity is subject to the same ecological limits that apply to the *krama*, and trekking revenue also flows into the forest and *subak* conservation treasury (Sunarta et al., 2023).

The third product, which is also the most sensitive, is the customary rituals and ceremonies themselves, such as the *Perang Pandan* (*Mekare-kare*) and *Usaba Sambah*, which attract both domestic and international tourists precisely because their schedules are determined entirely by the customary calendar (*sasih*) and not by a tourism promotion calendar. Wiriastari et al. (2024) refer to this mechanism as a gate-keeping device: the sacred space remains closed off from commercialisation because tourist access is governed by customary protocol, including which areas may be photographed, when tourists must step aside, and who has the authority to lead the procession, not by tickets or a tour operator's schedule. Precisely because the ritual is not repackaged for market convenience, it retains an authenticity that tourists regard as its main appeal, while also serving as field evidence for Condition 1 (Cultural Legitimacy) in the Indigenous Governance Triad proposition.

These three products, *geringsing* weaving, trekking through the customary landscape, and calendar-conditioned ritual, show the same pattern: Tenganan's tourism did not originate as an attraction engineered for the market, but rather as a limited window onto a living culture whose rules remain fully held by the customary community. This pattern contrasts with other Balinese tourist destinations that tend to experience commodification and land alienation for the sake of tourism

investment (Sunarta et al., 2023; Atmadja et al., 2025) and provides empirical support for the Cultural Autonomy component in the CALI framework: autonomy over space and time that makes Tenganan's tourism product structurally irreplaceable by any imitation destination.

Benefit flows are traced in Table 7. The distinction between collective revenue and family art shop profits matters for the Inclusive Distribution component, because funding ceremonies does not by itself establish inclusive distribution.

Table 7. Tourism benefit flows in Tenganan Pegringsingan

Flow	Source of revenue	Amount and period	Allocation and recipients	Evidence
Voluntary donations	Visitors	Not disclosed by the customary village	Customary village about 75%, administrative village about 25% (unwritten custom); boxes opened monthly and counted at the <i>petambunan</i> before all <i>krama</i> ; part returned as service pay as the <i>Klian</i> decide. Booth staff receive about 15% as service pay (SI-10, 23 September 2026)	MI-1, 19 May 2026, SI-10, 23 September 2026. No ledger was made available

Flow	Source of revenue	Amount and period	Allocation and recipients	Evidence
Parking	Three parking zones	Not available	East zone granted to the customary village (land granted by a ministry); Upper and VIP zones managed by the regional government; the customary village currently does not collect fees in the East zone, and fees from the government zones go to the regional government	KI-2, 1 April 2026, SI-5, 2 April 2026
Trekking and guiding	Guided walks (JED guides)	Village-level prices: tour IDR 150,000–200,000, trekking IDR 300,000 per person; about IDR 10,000 per package guest each to the customary village and the cooperative. JED package visitors number about 100 to 200 a year (MI-1, 19 May 2026)	JED retains about 25% for operations; year-end profit about 30% shared equally among 11 communities and 70% by visit contribution; guide fees go to cooperative guides. Allocation to forest and <i>subak</i> conservation is reported by Sunarta et al. (2023) and was not confirmed in interviews	MI-1, 19 May 2026, MI-2, April 2026, SI-4, 2 April 2026

Flow	Source of revenue	Amount and period	Allocation and recipients	Evidence
Paddy-field profit-sharing	Communal paddy fields	Not available	Harvest shared 50:50 between owners and sharecroppers from neighbouring villages. <i>Krama desa</i> receive monthly rice (about 25 to 50 kg, up to 200 kg in major ceremonial months) and cash allowances, which are larger for <i>luan</i> and <i>tambalapu</i> (about IDR 4 million) than for <i>bahan</i> (about IDR 2.5 million)	KI-1, 1 April 2026, MI-1, 19 May 2026, SI-2, April 2026, SI-5, 2 April 2026
Family art shops	<i>Geringsing</i> and souvenir sales	Private; not recorded as collective revenue	Owning families; stall rent paid to the customary treasury; a separate levy by the temple-based <i>pemaksan</i> goes to the temple, not to the customary treasury	Wirantari et al. (2025); SI-2 and SI-3, 2 April 2026 (kiosk rent IDR 10 million per five years, monthly sales about IDR 2 to 3 million)

Households with little or no tourism income, such as those that do not own an art shop, receive benefits mainly indirectly, if at all, through ceremonies and collective funds. Monthly rice and cash allowances are tied to membership of the *krama desa* (KI-1, 1 April 2026), so households outside it, such as *gumi pulangan* and *Banjar Pande* households, do not receive these allowances. Sharecroppers from neighbouring villages receive half of the harvest but

no share of tourism revenue (KI-1). Kiosk tenants reported falling sales since 2025, and several kiosks are vacant (SI-2, SI-3, 2 April 2026, MI-1, 19 May 2026). Two freelance guides operate outside the cooperative, while other residents with guiding skills have no recognised route to enter (MI-1, 19 May 2026). Many young people work outside the village and draw little direct income from tourism (SI-10, 23 September 2026).

3. Convergence Toward the Indigenous Governance Triad (IGT)

The persistence of this system is difficult to explain with any single theory in isolation. This study therefore proposes the Indigenous Governance Triad (IGT) as a case-derived proposition. In Tenganan, sustained tourism governance based on customary autonomy was associated with three conditions that worked together and interlocked with one another:

- a. Condition 1 (Cultural Legitimacy): Authority sourced from the communal constitution (*Awig-awig*) and cosmology, not from a state mandate or electoral selection.
- b. Condition 2 (Asymmetric Coordination): A stable multi-actor ecosystem that arises not from equal (symmetric) contractual negotiation among actors, but from the recognition by the actors studied of a single centre of legitimacy (*asymmetric polycentrism*), within shared rules supplied by the *Awig-awig*.
- c. Condition 3 (Cognitive Compliance): Rules that rest on the cognitive-cultural pillar (identity and taken-for-granted beliefs) in addition to regulative sanctions were associated with reported higher participation than formal regulation resting mainly on sanctions.

As a single positive case, Tenganan can suggest these conditions but cannot show that each is necessary. Contrasting cases would challenge the proposition if tourism governance remained stable where cultural legitimacy was weak or had been replaced by formal contracts (against Conditions 1 and 2), or if governance failed although all three conditions were present (against sufficiency). They would support it if villages with comparable written customary constitutions and recognised centres showed similar coordination patterns, and if villages lacking one condition showed instability or conflict. Paired comparisons or a small-N comparison across

Bali *Aga* and other customary villages would be appropriate tests.

4. Toward a Provisional CALI Framework

To make the IGT proposition easier to examine in other customary communities, this study organises it into the CALI framework. CALI is not a prescriptive recipe for other villages to imitate Tenganan; it is a provisional analytical framework that has not yet been applied beyond this case. The three IGT conditions map onto three CALI components: Condition 1 corresponds to Cultural Autonomy (C), Condition 2 to Asymmetric Coordination (A), and Condition 3 to Legitimacy-Based Compliance (L). The fourth component, Inclusive Distribution (I), was added because the evidence showed that the distribution of tourism benefits is where cultural legitimacy is both reproduced (through the funding of ceremonies and conservation) and put under pressure (through the concentration of art shop profits). Table 8 gives the questions, evidence requirements and interpretation procedure that another village could use. Figure 1 shows how the three theoretical lenses relate to the IGT conditions and the four CALI components.

- a. C (Cultural Autonomy): Autonomy over space (communal land) and time (customary calendar) that produces an irreplaceable tourism product.
- b. A (Asymmetric Coordination): A coordination architecture without a tourism-specific MOU, in which units know the boundaries of their domains through the shared *Awig-awig* rules and recognition of the customary village as the reference authority.
- c. L (Legitimacy-Based Compliance): A compliance mechanism that relies on community-based social sanctions, identification and moral obligation rather than on state enforcement officers. It is examined through the attendance comparison

between customary forums and formal meetings (Table 9), read together with the sanctions described in the Discussion.

- d. I (Inclusive Distribution): Mechanisms intended to return tourism benefits to collective purposes, such as paddy-field profit-sharing, voluntary donations and art shop rent. These funds pay for ceremonies and ecological conservation, which in

turn support cultural legitimacy in a self-reinforcing cycle. In Tenganan this component is best read as a customary ideal that is partly realised for collective revenue and is currently under pressure from the private concentration of art shop profits (Wirantari et al., 2025). It should not be read as an achieved outcome for the whole community (Table 7).




Figure 1. How the three theoretical lenses relate to the IGT conditions and the CALI components

Table 8. Provisional CALI indicators: questions, evidence and interpretation

Component	Diagnostic question	Evidence required	Interpretation
C: Cultural Autonomy	Does the community hold recognised authority over land use and ritual time, and has it kept that authority under external pressure?	Written rules and amendments; land tenure records; documented episodes in which external proposals were accepted, modified or declined	Strong if decisions on land and calendar have been upheld in documented episodes; partial if upheld only in some domains; weak if overridden
A: Asymmetric Coordination	Which units decide independently, and do disputes go to a recognised centre without tourism-specific contracts?	Actor matrix; decision records; at least one dispute or coordination episode per pair of units; shared rules	Asymmetric coordination if disputes are settled by reference to one centre within shared rules; fragmented if units act without any common rules

Component	Diagnostic question	Evidence required	Interpretation
L: Legitimacy-Based Compliance	Why do members take part and comply, and does compliance persist where sanctions are weak?	Participation records for comparable forums; sanctions attached to each; interview coding of identity, obligation and enforcement	Legitimacy-based if participation persists with weak sanctions and members cite identity or obligation; transactional if it depends on sanctions or incentives
I: Inclusive Distribution	Who receives tourism benefits, and who receives little or none?	Revenue and allocation records; household-level accounts including groups with little tourism income	Inclusive if collective revenue serves shared purposes and private concentration is bounded; under pressure if concentration is growing

For each component, evidence is gathered from at least two source types and judged strong, partial or weak, with the evidence trail recorded. Components are not summed into a score. Until the framework has been applied in at least one contrasting village, results should be read as descriptive profiles and not as diagnoses of institutional readiness.

5. Implications for the Tragedy of the Commons Debate

Hardin (1968) argued that resources under open access tend to degrade unless they are privatised or regulated by the state. The resources discussed here are not open access. The customary forest, communal paddy fields and cultural heritage are governed by membership rules (*krama* status), defined boundaries, prohibitions on land sale and graduated social sanctions under the *Awig-awig*, which is the kind of arrangement Ostrom (1990) described as collective resource management. Tenganan is therefore better read as a further case consistent with Ostrom's account than as a refutation of it. Any ranking of Tenganan against other long-lived customary commons in Indonesia would require systematic comparison, and a claim of uninterrupted sustainability over more than 180

years would require historical outcome records (such as land-cover, forest and paddy-area records) beyond the age of the constitution itself. For the forest, the village monograph records an indigenous forest area of 194 hectares in 2007 and the 2025 Village Profile records 197 hectares, which indicates a stable forest area but does not cover paddy land or earlier periods. This study offers the current state of the commons and informants' accounts of the past.

This study thus offers an explanatory account of how customary legitimacy, recognition of a customary centre and community-based compliance co-occur in one tourism setting. Predictive claims have not been tested and are reserved for future comparative research. The case supports arguments for treating Indigenous Public Administration as a distinct analytical perspective, not a local variant of conventional theory, but it does not show that IPA surpasses other theories in explanatory or predictive power.

Discussion

The empirical findings in Tenganan Pegringsingan present a paradox that challenges dominant assumptions in the CBT literature and contemporary tourism

governance. A systematic study by Wahyuni et al. (2025) of 54 articles on communal participation in Indonesia (2018–2025) reports that the main barriers to sustainability are tokenism, elite domination, and institutional fragmentation, which arise when tourism is engineered as an external intervention program. Tenganan appears as a positive outlier in these respects.

The rise in recorded visits between 2021 and 2024, which is partly pandemic recovery, was not accompanied by reported cultural degradation, privatisation of sacred space, or a permanent tourism-specific management institution, although the concentration of art shop profits is an emerging concern. Tourism was built on existing customary assets and governed through the *Awig-awig*, and participation is codified as a communal obligation internalised through a lengthy initiation process and living social sanctions (Atmadja et al., 2025; Coates et al., 2023). This suggests that when epistemological sovereignty and space-time autonomy are safeguarded as a priority, tourism expansion does not necessarily erode identity (Suripto et al., 2021; Wiriastari et al., 2024).

External facilitation offers a second comparison. Sunarta (2015) found that community participation in ecological tourism in West Bali National Park was largely functional and tied to an external agent, with local people having little say in decisions. The Wisnu Foundation and JED have supported Tenganan for 27 years through training and facilitation. Whether this support strengthens community decision authority or introduces dependencies depends on who sets the agenda and who funds activities. The customary village accepted participatory mapping of its 917 ha territory (1999–2000, funded by Yayasan KEHATI), strategic and spatial planning (2001), the formation of JED and the Danendra Cooperative, and a joint application for customary forest recognition. It accepted cultural documentation on the condition that the village decides what remains

confidential. The draft *pararem* for a customary village enterprise (BUPDA), facilitated by Wisnu from 2023, had not been ratified by the *petambunan* by the end of the study, and an inter-village commodity exchange through JED was discontinued after unpaid credit. No outright rejection of a Wisnu proposal was reported (MI-1, MI-2, SI-5). The comparison has limits. A national park is state-managed land with externally defined conservation goals, whereas Tenganan is an autonomous customary village that holds its own land and governance rules, so differences in participation reflect differences in authority structure as well as in programme design.

Coordination among the eight decision centres (the customary village, the administrative village, the cooperative, JED, the foundation, BUMDes, UMKM and the *banjar*) has operated without a tourism-specific MOU, but not without shared rules: the *Awig-awig* supplies common rules for land, ritual time and conduct. The units are not equally old (Table 4). Customary coordination under the *Awig-awig* is long-standing, whereas the Wisnu Foundation (about 27 years), the cooperative, JED, BUMDes and the tourism management body dissolved in 2023 are more recent arrangements (the Wisnu Foundation since 1998–1999, the Danendra Cooperative from 1999 as a self-help group and from 2002 as a cooperative, JED from 2001 (formally launched in 2002), BUMDes in 2022 and the tourism management body in 2020–2023).

The statement that coordination has been stable for more than four decades therefore applies only to the relations among the customary village, the administrative village and the temple-based *pemaksan* levy, and to the parking zones and the donation system, which informants describe as operating for decades without written agreement. This pattern does not contradict Ostrom (1990, 2010) and McGinnis (2011), whose accounts of nested enterprises and overlapping authority do not require equal units. It illustrates

a case in which asymmetry rests on a pre-existing customary constitution. Asymmetric Polycentrism is therefore a descriptive refinement: it highlights that stability here is associated with the recognition of a customary centre whose authority precedes that of other entities (Turnbull et al., 2023; Dewi et al., 2025). The dual authority between the customary village and the administrative village, previously mapped as a static hybrid model (Nuraeni et al., 2025; Suyadnya, 2021), can be read as nested governance.

The administrative village office stands on customary land, which is one indicator of the relationship, but authority is better established by actual decisions and statements from both institutions (Table 5). Examples include the limits on building height and road paving that the administrative village accepts, the requirement that its development proposals obtain customary permission, and the unwritten 25% share of visitor donations passed to it by the customary village (Table 5). The 2023 dissolution of the tourism management body did not disrupt the arrangement, since its functions reverted to the *petambunan* forum and the *Klian Adat*, which is consistent with trust and reputation supporting coordination (Rhodes, 1996, 1997).

The compliance mechanism binding these units is examined through what this study calls the Compliance Paradox. Table 9 reports the eligible participants, obligations, sanctions and scheduling for the *petambunan* forum and for BUMDes meetings. The customary forum was reported to be well attended without state enforcement, while BUMDes meetings, established under state-linked requirements, were sparsely attended. No attendance counts were recorded for either forum. The contrast rests on the accounts of the *Klian Adat* (KI-1, KI-2, 1 April 2026), the

BUMDes chair's statement that participation in its meetings is low (SI-6, 1 April 2026) and the researcher's observation of *petambunan* sessions. BUMDes meetings were not observed. The *Awig-awig* prescribes written sanctions for conduct within the *petambunan* but no fine for absence (Arts. 1 and 58). Three issues limit what this contrast can show. First, the same people may not be expected to attend both forums: *petambunan* membership is defined by krama status, whereas BUMDes meetings may involve a different set of members. Second, scheduling, agenda, incentives and social sanctions differ between the forums and may affect attendance independently of any institutional pillar.

Third, attendance alone does not separate cognitive identification (this is who we are), normative obligation (*ngayah* as a moral duty) and enforcement (sanctions for absence). To distinguish these, interview codes were assigned according to whether informants explained attendance through identity, moral obligation or fear of sanction, and the sanctions attached to each forum are recorded in Table 9. These explanations were coded under *legitimasi_adat*, *norma_sosial* and *sanksi_adat* in the coding matrices. BUMDes itself may draw on more than one pillar, since it also has normative elements such as accountability to villagers, so which pillars underpin it is treated as an empirical question. On this evidence the contrast is consistent with the *Awig-awig* being more deeply embedded than BUMDes (Scott, 2008; Coates et al., 2023), but it cannot isolate the causal effect of one institutional pillar (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Wirantari et al., 2025). Table 10 applies the Helmke and Levitsky typology to specific customary–state rule pairs; several types may coexist across different relationships.

Table 9. Attendance comparison between customary forums and BUMDes meetings

Forum	Meetings observed (dates)	Eligible participants	Attendance counts	Obligation and sanction	Scheduling, agenda and incentives
<i>Petambunan</i> (customary)	Observed during fieldwork, number of sessions not recorded	29 <i>krama desa</i> couples (KI-1) (also MI-2)	Not recorded	<i>Awig-awig</i> Art. 1: forum at Bale Agung on the first day of the customary month; sanctions are imposed in the forum; breaches of conduct lead to suspension from <i>krama desa</i> , and a member suspended three times is fined 2,000 (historical units), payable in the <i>sangkep</i> . Art. 58: suspension may include demotion, and reinstatement lapses if the fine is not paid within three days. Arts. 29, 40, 49, 50 and 57: exclusion from the assembly is itself a sanction. No article penalises absence as such	First day of the customary month; decisions on tourism, donations, packages and investment; monthly rice or cash allocation to <i>krama desa</i> (KI-1, MI-2)
BUMDes meetings (state-linked)	None observed	Community figures and village representatives invited (SI-6)	Not recorded	Attendance administratively required under the 2022 regulation; no sanction reported (SI-6)	Water tariffs and BUMDes operations, no incentives reported (SI-6)

Table 10. Customary–state rule pairs and Helmke and Levitsky types

Customary–state rule pair	Candidate type	Effectiveness of the formal rule	Compatibility of outcomes
2018 tourism levy regulation and the voluntary donation system	Substitutive	Formal rule not applied: the <i>Klian Adat</i> 's five technical questions to the Regency were never answered, and the regional audit agency later visited because no revenue reached the regional treasury; KI-2, 1 April 2026	Both aim to obtain contributions from visitors; the donation system has run for more than four decades; KI-2, 1 April 2026, SI-5 and SI-7, 2 April 2026
Village regulation on BUMDes water tariffs and customary control of water sources	Complementary	Tariffs are charged, although some residents still dispute paying for water (SI-6, 1 April 2026)	Customary and administrative officials help explain tariffs to residents (SI-6, KI-3, 1 April 2026)
BUMDes rules and <i>Awig-awig</i> provisions on tourism enterprises (including the BUPDA draft)	Not classifiable: both arrangements are weak	BUMDes meetings sparsely attended (SI-6, 1 April 2026)	BUPDA draft not ratified, so no customary enterprise rule is yet in force (MI-1, MI-2)
Bali Provincial Regulation Number 4 of 2019 and the <i>Awig-awig</i>	Accommodating	Recognises the customary village and its own designations (KI-1, 1 April 2026)	The customary village keeps its own structures and responds selectively to <i>Majelis Desa Adat</i> requirements (MI-2, April 2026)

The resilience of the 1842 customary constitution for nearly two centuries must also not be oversimplified as institutional inertia or resistance to modernity. Drawing on Streeck and Thelen's (2005) typology of institutional change, Tenganan follows a pattern of layering (adding new layers) rather than replacement (replacing old structures). Changes brought by the digital era, healthcare systems, and formal education are accepted selectively, so long as they do not alter the core cosmological meaning

and egalitarian structure (KI-2, 1 April 2026). This adaptive nature is reinforced by a three-layer protection of communal land (Articles 7, 37, and 48 of the *Awig-awig*), which empirically distinguishes Tenganan from six other Balinese customary villages experiencing concerns over land alienation to investors (Sunarta et al., 2023). Path dependency here is self-reinforcing: every generation that returns to the village (including, according to informants, most migrant krama after they start

families) inherits not only land, but also a network of meaning that renders the social and spiritual cost of deviation prohibitive (North, 1990; Mahoney, 2000). The system is therefore not static; it is sustained through deliberative consensus-based discussion, which, according to Coates et al. (2023), constitutes the community's sovereign right to make decisions at a tempo determined by its own internal logic, rather than by market speed or bureaucratic targets.

The material above is combined into the case-derived Indigenous Governance Triad (IGT) and the provisional CALI framework (Cultural Autonomy, Asymmetric Coordination, Legitimacy-Based Compliance, Inclusive Distribution). IGT proposes that sustained tourism governance based on customary autonomy was associated with three interlocking conditions: cultural legitimacy that formal regulation does not replace, asymmetric coordination based on reciprocal recognition, and compliance rooted in the cognitive pillar. As a form of methodological reflexivity (Flick, 2023; Creswell & Poth, 2018), this section separates current fieldwork from earlier material and acknowledges limits. Current fieldwork was conducted from January to June 2026. Earlier material comprises visitor records for 2021–2025, a study by the Faculty of Tourism of Universitas Udayana and the Karangasem Tourism Office and historical documents, so comparisons with the 2017 study describe change between sources and are not longitudinal measurement.

Substantive vulnerabilities are as follows. First, dependence on foreign tourists (81% in 2025: 29,224 of 35,976 recorded visits, Table 3) is exposed to shocks beyond the reach of the *Awig-awig*. Second, informants raised concern about groundwater extraction by hotels in Candidasa; if hydrological data confirmed it, internal polycentric governance would lack the jurisdiction to address this regional externality. Third, informants reported that some customary rules are being relaxed in

practice, such as the limit on gambling to one month a year (MI-1, 19 May 2026), and that passing on governance knowledge to the young depends on individual initiative (SI-6, 1 April 2026). If the cognitive pillar loses its mechanisms of reproduction, compliance may weaken regardless of how strong the written articles are. The study also has methodological limits. Purposive and snowball sampling may over-represent informants close to institutional positions. Many accounts are retrospective and subject to recall and presentation bias. There are no longitudinal outcome measurements, so changes in compliance, benefit distribution or ecological condition are inferred and not measured. Tenganan is therefore presented not as a universal blueprint, but as a case from which propositions can be tested elsewhere.

CONCLUSION

This study asked how cultural tourism in the Bali Aga village of Tenganan Pegringsingan was governed while recorded visits rose about 21.8-fold between 2021, a pandemic-affected baseline, and 2024, with no permanent tourism-specific management institution at the end of the period, no adoption of the state tourism levy regulation, and no reported degradation of core customary values. The main finding is that eight decision centres coordinated under shared *Awig-awig* rules without a tourism-specific MOU, recognising the customary village as the reference authority, and that attendance was reported to be higher in customary forums than in BUMDes meetings, a contrast consistent with, but not isolating, the role of the cognitive-cultural pillar. The contribution is a case-derived proposition, the Indigenous Governance Triad (IGT), a provisional framework, the CALI framework, and a further case for the debate on the commons that is consistent with Ostrom's account. The limits are those of a single case: the IGT and CALI require testing in contrasting cases, the concentration of art shop

profits qualifies any claim of inclusive distribution, and the evidence rests on informants' accounts and documents rather than longitudinal measurement.

Although the governance system appeared internally resilient during the study period, boundary conditions point to vulnerabilities. The recommendations below are drawn from this study's evidence and from concerns raised by informants, and final decisions belong to the customary village. First, the study reports that 81% of visitors are foreign (in 2025: 29,224 of 35,976 recorded visits, Table 3) and that recorded visits fell by 8.4% in 2025. The decline is calculated as $(2024 \text{ count} - 2025 \text{ count}) / 2024 \text{ count}$, from 39,264 to the recorded 2025 count of 35,976. Attribution of the decline to geopolitical shocks is a hypothesis, and other explanations, such as exchange rates, airfares, competing destinations and changes in counting, should be examined before it is accepted.

The study's own evidence for this cause is limited to informants' remarks (for example, a craft trader who linked slower trade to the war); it was not tested against exchange-rate, airfare or counting data. The customary village may consider exploring educational packages for domestic institutions as one way to diversify markets, but domestic educational demand may also be sensitive to economic conditions, school budgets and travel costs, and should not be assumed to be insulated from international conditions. Second, to reduce the risk that the cognitive-cultural pillar weakens, the customary village may consider whether a *pararem* on the substance of teaching in the *Metrana Nyoman* and *Medaha* initiation processes would be appropriate; this concern was raised by a former *Perbekel*, and decisions on content rest with customary authorities. Third, the BUPDA draft, complete since 2023, awaits ratification. Ratification through full consensus among the six *Klian Adat* may be preferable, because ratification without consensus risks repeating the legitimacy difficulties experienced by BUMDes,

while prolonged delay may allow tourism economic activity to operate outside customary oversight.

For the Karangasem Regency Government, the findings and informants' concerns suggest an adaptive role in which development programs are aligned with the priorities set by the customary village rather than the reverse. Informants expressed concern that groundwater extraction for hotels in the Candidasa coastal area could affect water springs and the 255-hectare communal paddy fields. This study did not collect hydrological data, so the concern is reported as an informant perception and the link between extraction and water impacts remains unverified. Before new permit rules are recommended, the responsibilities for groundwater permitting and basin management at national, provincial and regency level should be identified. A step supported by this study is that the regency and the responsible agencies commission a hydrological assessment and consult the Tenganan community, which raised the concern.

Whether permit conditions should change would depend on the results of that assessment. These measures follow from informants' priorities and not from independent measurement, and they represent the views of the customary leaders and residents interviewed. Finally, for Public Administration as a discipline, the case suggests that Indigenous Public Administration deserves attention as a distinct perspective in curricula and research. Concepts such as Asymmetric Polycentrism and the Compliance Paradox are provisional, and could be developed into diagnostic instruments only after they have been applied and compared in other customary communities.

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AI USE STATEMENT

No generative AI tools were used in the conception, analysis, writing or editing of this manuscript.

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